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Appealing to Heaven: Jephthah, John Locke, and 
Just War 
Abstract: This paper asks why John Locke relied so heavily on the biblical exemplum 
of Jephthah in the “Second Treatise of Government.” The proposed answer is that Locke 
took Jephthah to stand for the situation of judgment about the validity of norms under 
uncertainty. It was the contention of norms in a moment of potential warfare, not the 
absence of applicable norms, that Jephthah symbolized. On this specific point, Locke 
fits within a tradition of Protestant invocations of the story. If so, there was no need for 
Locke’s political theory to follow the details of the Jephthah story in other particulars. 
The paper pursues this argument by attributing to Locke a distinction between subjective 
conviction and objective validity, the latter of which he thought God alone could judge.
…Jephtha, who by argument, Not worse than by his shield 
and spear, Defended Israel from the Ammonite.
—John Milton, Samson Agonistes
When General Putnam gave the Signal, the whole Army 
shouted their loud Amen by three Cheers, immediately upon 
which a Cannon was fired from the Fort, and the Standard 
lately sent to General Putnam was exhibited[,] flourishing in 
the Air, bearing… this Motto, Appeal to Heaven.
—Anonymous, Account of Continental Army, July 18, 1775
I am grateful to Suzanne Last Stone for the invitation that prompted me to write this 
paper, and to Julian Franklin, Andrew Rehfeld, Melissa Schwartzberg, and Michael 
Stanislawski for their helpful comments.
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1. Introduction
John Locke’s interesting and wholly neglected obsession with the story of 
Jephthah, a minor figure in the book of Judges, plays a crucial role in the 
Second Treatise of Government. It may even illustrate the indispensably 
religious origins of the commitment to a polity based on the consent of 
the governed. As Andrew Rehfeld recently emphasized in the lone article 
ever written on the subject, Locke’s treatment of this biblical character 
is so selective that it is bewildering Locke could have made use of him 
at all. Nevertheless, I will argue in what follows that Locke’s invocations 
of Jephthah flowed out of and developed a Protestant tradition of inter-
preting the sequence, a tradition for which the Jephthah story illustrated 
the applicability of norms of justice to warfare even in a situation of 
opposing claims of right.1 This function, and not other elements of the 
biblical story that were of little or no interest to Locke, is the proper 
focus. Indeed, Locke’s obsession with Jephthah may reveal that modern 
liberalism, which is prepared to tolerate more contention in morality and 
politics than any other doctrine so far, could have emerged only because 
of the religious assumption that God would judge otherwise unfettered 
and unguided human choice, when no other authority obtained.
2. Wars of Words and Weapons
Over the ages, what readers have found most memorable about Jephthah, 
the illegitimate son of a harlot who is summoned from his life as a bandit 
to lead Israel’s military defenses, is his vow. When he resolves to com-
mence battle against the Ammonites in return for rule over Israel if he 
succeeds, he promises to sacrifice to God the first creature he sees upon 
returning home victoriously. This ill-fated creature is, of course, his own 
daughter, who is duly put to death (though some rabbinic commentators 
struggled mightily to find some other way of interpreting the verses). This 
tragedy is the subject of G.F. Handel’s oratorio and many other works 
of literature and art in the Western tradition.2 What interested Locke, 
however, is something else, quite marginal in the overall history of the 
1 Andrew Rehfeld, “Jephthah, the Hebrew Bible, and John Locke’s Second Treatise 
of Government,” Hebraic Political Studies 3:1 (2008), pp. 60–93, which the author kindly 
shared with me in advance after he and I learned of our independent work on this strik-
ing omission from the literature.
2 See Wilbur Sypherd, Jephthah and His Daughter: A Study in Comparative Literature 
(Newark: Rutgers University Press, 1948); Mikael Sjöberg, Wrestling with Textual 
Violence: The Jephthah Narrative in Antiquity and Modernity (Sheffield: Sheffield Phoenix 
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reception of this decidedly minor figure: Jephthah’s colloquy with the 
Ammonites before going to war.
Jephthah sends a query to the Ammonite king, according to Judges 
11, asking why he is preparing to invade. The answer is that the Israelites 
took the land, “from Ammon even unto the Jabbok, and unto Jordan,” 
and now the Ammonites want it back.3 Though the prior history is, as 
is usual in these cases, not entirely clear, Jephthah responds by pointing 
out that the Ammonites had been displaced by a former king, Sihon, 
who lost the land when he attacked the Israelites, who were trying to 
pass through at a later date.4 But Jephthah soon turns to a different argu-
ment. Whatever their specific catalysts, it fulfilled a divine purpose for 
the Israelites to win these campaigns: Yahweh gave the Israelites the 
land, and the Israelites took it—just as the Ammonites, Jephthah says, 
would keep with a clear conscience what their deity gave them.5 Anyway, 
Jephthah concludes, the Israelites have been there three hundred years; if 
the Ammonites wanted to make some claim to the land, why wait all this 
time to assert it? In the crucial verse, Jephthah concludes, “Wherefore I 
have not sinned against thee, but thou doest me wrong to war against me: 
the Lord the Judge be judge this day between the children of Israel and 
the children of Ammon.”6
To this message, the Ammonites “hearkened not,” whereupon Jephthah 
brings the battle to the enemy amidst “very great slaughter” and wins out; 
not long after, he leaves the stage of history.
It is noticeable, first of all, that Jephthah gives two seemingly dif-
ferent kinds of replies in his messages to the Ammonite king. The first 
one might justifiably call “secular.” Apparently, Jephthah thinks that the 
Israelites won the land fair and square in an unsought and defensive war. 
No one can doubt that he thinks that warfare to reverse this possession—
even in favor of the original inhabitants—is explicitly an unjust cause. 
Alternatively, a long passage of time has supervened on these now dis-
tant events. Jephthah might be suggesting that the Ammonite claims are 
simply a pretext for aggression. Otherwise, why make them now and not 
before? More creatively read, he could be invoking what Anglo-American 
Press, 2006). For Handel in context, see Ruth Smith, Handel’s Oratorios and Eighteenth-
Century Thought (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995). 
3 Judges 11:13.
4 Cf. Numbers 20–21, to which the Jephthah story is linked as a haftarah.
5 Technically, Jephthah refers to Chemosh, who was the Moabite deity, suggesting 
that at this point the Ammonites and Moabites were federated and that Jephthah was 
addressing both throughout, or else he was simply confused.
6 Judges 11:27.
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law calls adverse possession: even supposing for the sake of argument 
that the conquest of Israel had been tainted (he does not appear to dis-
pute that the Ammonites were dispossessed), time has settled the title in 
favor of the current occupants.
But then, in the end, Jephthah shifts. Israelite sovereignty is God’s 
promise and plan. Jephthah has moved from the secular to the sacred. 
Still, the secular, argumentative colloquy is there; it prefaces the usual 
boast that God is on the Israelites’ side. John Milton specifically claimed 
that Jephthah by argument defended his people. Or, as Amos Oz narrates 
this moment in his fictional rendition of Jephthah’s life:
Calmly the judge of Israel waged a war of words with the king of 
Ammon by means of envoys who passed to and fro: to whom did 
the land really belong, whose forefathers had settled it first, what 
was written in all the chronicles, who was in the right and who had 
justice on his side.7
Whatever the place for normative deliberation, however, the biblical 
text also makes clear that in the end it is not easy to know who has jus-
tice on his side. The crux of interpreting the passage is determining what 
Jephthah means when he says, “the Lord the Judge be judge.” The sim-
plest interpretation is that God will decide the coming war: the battle will 
show what God wants, or which god wins. In the end, it is a matter not of 
rival arguments, but of rival powers—or rival deities. God will “judge” in 
the sense of making world history the world court, Weltgeschichte becom-
ing Weltgericht. This episode could fit, at first glance, with the “Yahweh 
war” or divine war ideology of much of the Hebrew Bible’s discussions 
of the topic.8 There is, however, a major glitch in this interpretation. If it 
is correct, why does Jephthah bother making the “secular” arguments at 
all? It seems as if there are some normative considerations worth men-
tioning—the war of words—independently of God’s undoubted power 
to advance his inscrutable designs and unfathomable election of his pre-
ferred nation.
The invocation of God the judge here is not wholly unlike other pas-
sages, such as Genesis 16:5 and I Samuel 24:12, but it nowhere else involves 
“international relations.” Indeed, a few biblical scholars have emphasized 
the uniqueness of this moment as a divergence from the Yahweh war 
7 Amos Oz, “Upon this Evil Earth,” in Oz, Where the Jackals Howl and Other 
Stories, trans. Nicholas de Lange and Philip Simpson (New York: Houghton Mifflin, 
1981), p. 211.
8 See Gerhard von Rad, Holy War in Ancient Israel, trans. Marva J. Dawn (Grand 
Rapids, Mich.: W.B. Eeardmans, 1991); and Sa-Moon Kang, Divine War in the Old 
Testament and in the Ancient Near East (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1989).
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tradition. Susan Niditch, perhaps a little hyperbolically given how spare 
the text is, calls Jephthah’s “concern with political ethics stunning… wars 
require just causes and to fight without just cause is to do evil.”9 On 
closer inspection, then, Jephthah might mean that God will “judge” in the 
sense of actually assessing the legitimacy of the claims on each side—the 
Israelite claim of just possession of the land versus the Ammonite “right 
of return.” It is even possible that Jephthah, unsure of where the argu-
ments fall out in this case, appeals to God to determine who is right. 
The first half of the decisive verse (“Wherefore I have not sinned against 
thee”) defiantly states his subjective confidence in the morality of his side, 
but the second half might acknowledge that there are two sides and that 
there are plausible arguments for each; and Jephthah is hardly the right 
person to decide between their objective merits.10 No one can be judge 
in his own cause; fortunately God is there to make the call. (Of course, 
the Ammonites also have their own god.)
If this last interpretation is correct—and I have developed it, of 
course, because I shall argue that it is Locke’s interpretation—then this 
story illustrates that there are just and unjust wars in the Bible, not sim-
ply just and unjust methods of war.11 But there is a twist. It would not 
be the case that the Jephthah story indicates an implicit doctrine not 
only of permitted but also of proscribed wars in biblical sources. For 
Jephthah—supposing for a moment that when he invokes God the judge, 
he is actually uncertain about the legitimacy of his cause—still proceeds 
forthwith to battle. But this interpretation would say that the distinc-
tion between permitted and forbidden wars cannot be the same as that 
9 Susan Niditch, War in the Hebrew Bible: A Study in the Ethics of Violence (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1993), p. 126. Similarly, Jacques Cazeaux marvels that 
“l’étonnant discours que Jephté adresse au défi des Ammonites le fait passer sous nos yeux 
du statut de bandit à celui de théologien averti. Non seulement il récite l’Histoire sacrée 
des Israélites, mais lui, l’homme de main et de violence, flanqué de gredins, il ne retient de 
l’épopée que la volonté de douceur, de paix.” Cazeaux, Le refus de la guerre sainte: Josué, 
Juges et Ruth (Paris: Cerf, 1998), p. 183.
10 One biblical scholar says the appeal to heaven is “not a prediction; not necessarily 
even said in absolute confidence of Israel’s winning.” Robert G. Boling, ed., Judges (The 
Anchor Bible) (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1975), p. 204.
11 While there are jus in bello norms in the Bible, Michael Walzer restates the tradi-
tional view that it lacks jus ad bellum norms; but like Grotius, Locke thought otherwise 
and reasoned that the Jephthah pericope proved it. See Walzer, “War and Peace in the 
Jewish Tradition,” in Terry Nardin, ed., The Ethics of War and Peace: Religious and 
Secular Perspectives (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998). Aviezer Ravitzky dis-
agrees in the same volume. Both pieces are reprinted in Walzer, ed., Law, Politics, and 
Morality in Judaism (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006). Compare Hersch 
Lauterpacht, “Some Biblical Problems of the Law of War,” in his International Law: Being 
the Collected Papers of Hersch Lauterpacht, ed. Elihu Lauterpacht, vol. 5 (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2004), pp. 715–727.
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between just and unjust ones, if the war has to be fought either way. If it 
is possible for God to deem one’s cause unjust, in other words, that does 
not mean one does not fight. According to this reading of the story of 
Jephthah, there is indeed a difference in the Hebrew Bible between just 
and unjust wars, but it is decided only by God, perhaps by means of the 
war itself (or visible in its results), perhaps in some other way. In sum, it 
may be that there are no forbidden wars in the Bible, not because there 
are no unjust wars, but because their injustice is not always possible to 
fully ascertain in advance of fighting them. If Jephthah introduces secular 
“political ethics” into the theory of warfare, it is not to displace sacred 
decision, and thus divine war, but ultimately to depend on it. Jephthah 
may exhibit the existence of secular argument, but not its independence.
The trouble with this “strange doctrine” (as Locke once called another 
part of his theory) is that it is not really the doctrine of just and unjust 
wars one may have wanted to find in the biblical sources. Locke, we will 
see, was surprisingly unfazed by it, and it is important to consider why. It 
is a crucial question at the heart of his social contract theory: he took the 
episode as the touchstone for reflecting on the morality of war, not really 
among states, but in their formation out of prepolitical conflict among 
individuals, as well as in their potential dissolution in violent insurrec-
tion. His point, apparently, is to vindicate the existence of norms even at 
those moments in human affairs when they seem to have least hold over 
conduct, with frequently catastrophic results.
3. Appealing to Heaven
In Locke’s Second Treatise, Jephthah is discussed in detail at three criti-
cal points and referenced half a dozen times more—more than Abraham, 
Isaac, Jacob, Moses, Joshua, Saul, and David, not to mention Jesus (or 
any other New Testament character). Only Adam, the central figure in 
the biblically saturated First Treatise, is explicitly discussed as much as 
Jephthah in its sequel, and far less if implicit references are counted.12 
But this unusual prominence for a biblical cipher has yet to be given 
any real attention in Locke scholarship, even in the present golden age 
of acknowledgment of the religious origins and cast of his thought in 
general.
In his epoch-making 1960 edition of Locke’s Two Treatises, Peter 
Laslett commented at two points in passing footnotes that Jephthah 
12 On Locke’s knowledge of the Bible and uses of Adam and others in the First 
Treatise, see Kim Ian Parker, The Biblical Politics of John Locke (Waterloo, Ont.: Wilfrid 
Laurier University Press, 2004).
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was “critical to Locke’s use of Scripture to sanction his political theory” 
and “crucial to the scriptural foundations of his case about civil soci-
ety and justice.”13 That Locke plucked Jephthah from obscurity to make 
him the biblical exemplum of the Second Treatise seemingly would have 
then been set for attention. Inaugurating the age of taking Locke’s reli-
giosity seriously, John Dunn insisted that “Locke continues to use [the 
Hebrew Bible’s] exemplary resources as the accredited vocabulary for dis-
cussing political issues.” And while he footnoted the Jephthah story as 
his first proof, he did not otherwise discuss it in his book.14 Further, in 
John Marshall’s study, the most imposing monument left (so far) by the 
Cambridge school on Locke, Jephthah doesn’t merit a mention, contextual 
matters submerging a point of apparent textual importance.15 Meanwhile, 
in his brilliant, recent God, Locke, and Equality, Jeremy Waldron—dis-
senting from the Cambridge school’s methods but certainly vindicating 
its intended stress on religion and Scripture—spends a chapter on why 
Locke referenced the Old Testament more than the New Testament in 
the Two Treatises. And yet Waldron is interested in Locke’s argument for 
basic equality rather than his social contract theory, and so references 
Jephthah only once in passing.16
For Locke, the story of Jephthah illustrated, most of all, that violence 
is justified when there is no other way to be true to one’s moral principles. 
This is not because one’s interpretation of morality will always be correct. 
Rather, it is because Jephthah shows that war is justified in circumstances 
of subjective conviction of the justice of one’s cause, because God will 
confirm or deny if this subjective belief is objectively correct. Jephthah’s 
symbolic importance in this regard immediately comes to the fore as part 
of Locke’s natural law teaching, where the state of nature devolves into 
the state of war—when he comes to the problem of where the “strange 
13 John Locke, Two Treatises of Government, student ed., ed. Peter Laslett (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1988), notes to II, §§260 and 263. I will cite the Second 
Treatise, per convention, by section number. Kirstie McClure, noting this material and 
a few other historical invocations of Jephthah, has done the most to give this bibli-
cal figure’s importance for Locke its due, in several extended footnotes. See McClure, 
“Between the Castigation of Texts and the Excess of Words: Political Theory in the 
Margins of Tradition,” in Aryeh Botwinick and William E. Connolly, eds., Democracy 
and Vision: Sheldon Wolin and the Vicissitudes of the Political (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 2001), p. 229.
14 John Dunn, The Political Thought of John Locke: An Historical Account of the 
Argument of the “Two Treatises of Government” (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1969), p. 99, cf. 180.
15 John Marshall, John Locke: Resistance, Religion, and Responsibility (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1994).
16 Jeremy Waldron, God, Locke, and Equality: Christian Foundations in Locke’s 
Political Thought (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), ch. 7.
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doctrine” that individuals may execute the law of nature might lead. Of 
course, this executive power should not exclude peace, and in any case 
the fearful consequences of the strange doctrine have to be assessed in 
a fair comparison to a sometimes despotic state.17 But this power might 
lead, Locke forthrightly acknowledges, to a situation in which there are 
rival claims about which side in a conflict is just, which interpretation of 
the law of nature is correct.
The most important passage is as follows:
To avoid this State of War (wherein there is no appeal but to 
Heaven, and wherein every the least difference is apt to end, where 
there is no Authority to decide between the Contenders) is one 
great reason of Mens putting themselves into Society, and quitting the 
State of Nature: for where there is an Authority, a Power on Earth, 
from which relief can be had by appeal, there the continuance of 
the State of War is excluded, and the Controversie is decided by that 
Power. Had there been any such Court, any superior Jurisdiction on 
Earth, to determine the right between Jephtha and the Ammonites, 
they had never come to a State of War: but we see he was forced 
to appeal to Heaven. The Lord the Judge (says he) be Judge this day 
between the Children of Israel and the children of Ammon, Judg. 
11. 27. and then Prosecuting, and relying on his appeal, he leads out 
his Army to Battle.18
This section obviously calls for a great deal of commentary. One place to 
begin is by noting that whatever the biblical passage was once about, its 
stakes have increased dramatically, as the norms of international society 
have suddenly become equivalent to prepolitical norms as such. And, as 
we shall see momentarily, they are always there as a source of appeal in 
cases where the state breaks down or one believes it has so fundamentally 
transgressed justice that war is necessary to right the situation.
In a masterful study, Richard Tuck has shown that in early mod-
ern natural law thinking a momentous analogy was forged between the 
contest of powerful sovereigns and the relations of individuals in statu 
naturalis.19 Locke hardly invented this by-then hoary analogy, based as 
it was on the post-Westphalian (and, as Tuck emphasizes, colonizing) 
state rather than the intertribal warfare of the biblical scene. Yet, unlike 
in the case of Thomas Hobbes’ Leviathan, the model of competing states 
on which the state of nature is explicitly based for both thinkers does not 
17 Locke, Second Treatise, §13.
18 Ibid., §21.
19 Richard Tuck, The Rights of War and Peace: Political Thought and the International 
Order from Grotius to Kant (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999).
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lead Locke to an assumption of no norms whatever. What the Jephthah 
story means in the first instance to Locke, then, is that if the interna-
tional scene is to be the template against which the state of nature is 
drawn, then the Bible—at least this story in it—shows that the interna-
tional scene is not a normless “anarchical society.” As for Niditch, for 
Locke the Jephthah story illustrates that there may be a political ethics 
that legitimates (or not) conflict.
Indeed, Locke may take this reading of the story very far. Before 
Locke, Hugo Grotius, who expressed no other interest in the Jephthah 
story, appealed to it to make the point that there are norms in warfare. 
In his chapter “Whether ’tis ever lawful to make war,” in The Rights of 
War and Peace, Grotius noted that “GOD himself prescribed to his People 
certain general and established rules for making War, Deut. xx. 10, 15. 
thereby plainly shewing, that War might sometimes be just, even without 
a special command.” This claim, of course, clearly resonates with Grotius’ 
more famous general interest in discovering valid norms that might hold 
independently of the still indubitable premise of God’s authority. But 
since in the Bible God “did not declare the just Reasons of making War,” 
Grotius continued, “he thereby supposes that they may be easily discov-
ered by the Light of Nature. Such was the Cause of the War made by 
Jephthah against the Ammonites, in defense of their Borders, Judges xi.”20 
In other words, there was a tradition before Locke that holds Jephthah to 
illustrate that norms, not their absence, govern warfare.
But Locke takes this reading much further, introducing a powerful 
fallibilist note in Jephthah’s thinking. The light of nature is there, but it is 
not strong enough. The problem that Locke underlines—which is pres-
ent in the biblical story of Jephthah only implicitly, if at all—is that the 
contending arguments for just and unjust cause under general norms 
constitute an epistemic problem as much as a political one. More accu-
rately, it is because resolving the just cause in a dispute is an epistemic 
problem that it is a political one. For Locke, Jephthah wants to subsume 
his personal conduct under general norms, but the trouble is that it is 
very hard for him to know that he is properly doing so, especially when 
the other side claims to be doing the same thing. The war of words can 
seem irresolvable—and this very fact can undermine the certainty with 
which both sides began.
20 Hugo Grotius, The Rights of War and Peace, 3 vols., ed. Richard Tuck (Indianapolis: 
Liberty Fund, 2003), book 1, ch. 2, §2, p. 186. On Grotius and the counterfactual 
assumption of God’s nonexistence or apathy, see, for example, James St. Leger, The 
“Etiamsi Daremus” of Hugo Grotius: A Study in the Origins of International Law (Rome: 
Pontificium Atheneum Internationale, 1962).
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Another way to put this point is to say that Locke anachronistically 
imputes to the story the modern sense of “judging” as an intellectual 
activity. This is so even while elsewhere in the text he cites the story of 
Jephthah for the proposition that in biblical times judging meant mili-
tary-political leadership. “And thus in Israel it self,” Locke says,
the chief Business of their Judges… seems to have been to be Captains 
in War, and Leaders of their Armies; which… appears plainly in the 
Story of Jephtha…. And the People made him head and captain over 
them, Judg. 11.11. which was, as it seems, all one as to be Judge. And 
he judged Israel, Judg. 12. 7 that is, was their Captain-General.21
It is easy to detect in this passage—as is made wholly explicit in his one 
invocation of this story in the First Treatise—that Locke is attracted to 
Jephthah because he thinks his “election” is not patriarchalist but pop-
ular.22 This interpretation is perhaps Locke at his weakest, for while 
Jephthah’s eventual rulership is clearly an alternative to patriarchal suc-
cession, Locke has filtered out two glaring and incontestable facts: that 
Jephthah is chosen by the Israelite elders before the people ratify that 
choice, and that he becomes judge not when he is made military head but 
when he is victorious.23 In any case, it suits Locke to register his aware-
ness in these passages that the office of judge that Jephthah holds, and 
that gives its name to the book of the Bible in which his story figures, is 
a title of leadership and rule. But in his other deployments of Jephthah, 
and thus in his central uses, Locke cuts across this historical admission 
to present judging as a deliberative activity determining the validity of 
contending norms deployed in good faith. This is why, overall, Hobbes 
and Locke posed the problem of a lack of a common authority so dif-
ferently: for Hobbes, it was the absence of general norms, whereas for 
Locke, it was the difficulty of knowing how they fall out when in con-
tention. And Locke selected the story of Jephthah because he thought it 
21 Locke, Second Treatise, §109.
22 In the First Treatise, §163, Locke cites the book of Judges for examples of rulers 
who are not chosen on the basis of fatherly lineages. Raising the potential counterar-
gument that God has perhaps simply transferred fatherly authority to new people in 
those stories, Locke responds that this scenario “is manifestly not so in the Story of 
Jephtha, where he Articled with the People, and they made him Judge over them, as is 
plain, Judg. 11.”
23 To put it differently, Locke’s interpretation that becoming military captain is 
“all one as to be Judge” is clearly mistaken, as it ignores the initial colloquy between 
Jephthah and the Israelite elders of Judges 11:4–11, where Jephthah specifically negoti-
ates political leadership (thus, judgeship) contingent upon success in separate and prior 
military leadership. Rehfeld’s article explores many other divergences between parts of 
the Jephthah story in which Locke was not interested and Locke’s doctrines.
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illustrated precisely the situation he thought could come to prevail in the 
state of nature.
Of course, the moralized nature of wars of words does not mean wars 
of death and destruction do not come to pass. Nevertheless, Jephthah’s 
tale is useful to Locke for illustrating that these actual conflicts are mor-
alized, too. The most obvious way in which they are moralized is noted 
by Waldron, who observes (citing Second Treatise, §21, and the Jephthah 
story) that for Locke
awareness of the existence of God also underpins people’s ability 
to take seriously the idea of objective right answers to the moral 
questions to which their actions give rise. For example, think how 
important it is for Locke, in his theory of revolution, to be able to 
invoke the idea of an “appeal to Heaven,” which is not at all the 
same as an appeal for divine intervention, but a kind of acknowl-
edgment that a person embarking on a course of active resistance 
makes to show that he understands there really is an objective right 
and wrong of the matter, and that he is ready to take the conse-
quences at God’s hands if it turns out that he is disturbing the peace 
and order of the realm for no good reason.24
That (unlike for Hobbes) there are norms and that the justice and injus-
tice of the causes they underwrite is unclear does not mean the state of 
war does not come to pass. One way out in this “inconvenient” situation 
is to form a political society in the Hobbesian way of creating a com-
mon judge who will settle disputes. But for Locke, the Jephthah story 
illustrates that the warfare one might have to choose in the alternative 
to political compact is never without moral constraint. When there is no 
judge on earth, and no way of creating one, there is always one in heaven, 
watching over the battle. And that means there are just and unjust wars, 
even if sometimes only God can tell which is which. What if this trust in 
God was one of the conditions for Locke’s bold insertion in social con-
tract theory of consent as a condition of sovereignty, given the risks of 
bloody contention he knew it entails?
Insofar as Jephthah is the model for action when norms conflict, he 
appears in the Second Treatise more or less continuously. He is there, 
roughly, anytime there is no judge on earth to settle disputes, and Locke 
frequently uses variations of the idea of appealing to heaven, often apart 
from when (in fact, even before) Jephthah is cited by name.25 Waldron 
errs slightly in forgetting what is at issue in the first invocation of the 
24 Waldron, God, Locke, and Equality, pp. 225–226.
25 Locke, Second Treatise, §§19–20, 87, 91, 94, 168, and 242.
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Jephthah story that he cites—the state of nature, or, more accurately, the 
state of war—but forgivably so, since Locke himself allows Jephthah’s 
example to resonate throughout the treatise, eventually culminating in 
his discussion of the right of revolution from within political society. 
“Who shall be Judge,” Locke asks at the tail end of the text in the famous 
section, “whether the Prince or Legislative act contrary to their Trust?” 
To the best-known part of his answer (“To this I reply, The People shall 
be the Judge”) he adds:
But farther, this Question, (Who shall be Judge?) cannot mean, that 
there is no Judge at all. For where there is no Judicature on Earth, 
to decide Controversies amongst Men, God in Heaven is Judge…. 
[One can] appeal to the Supream Judge, as Jephtha did.26
Just as in the prepolitical state of war, in intrapolitical contention, 
Jephthah’s appeal to heaven is available, even necessary, when no other 
recourse is possible. Leo Strauss was correct to note, “Jephtha’s statement, 
which refers to a controversy between two nations, is used by Locke as 
the locus classicus concerning controversies between the government and 
the people.”27 Except that this transposition—as Tuck has shown, hoary 
by Locke’s time—allows Jephthah’s tale to be, much more broadly, the 
signature of fundamental conflict as such, prepolitical and intrapolitical.
4. Subjective Conviction and Objective Validity
But does the story of Jephthah really show that there are moral con-
straints on the initiation of warfare or simply that, as a later philosopher 
would put it, a good war hallows any cause? One of the more interesting 
features of Locke’s account is that while he insists that warfare is initi-
ated under moral norms, he also clearly insists that one’s assessment of 
how the conflict of norms is to be decided—indeed, one’s assessment 
of whether they are in violation at all—is an absolutely personal and 
subjective decision. This point must be emphasized, because it can eas-
ily—some have said, too easily—lead to doubts that Locke could have 
seriously intended his stress on the objectivity of norms.
In the central passage of §21, Locke clearly shows that the threat 
of decisional regress can make the validity of the “appeal to heaven” 
exclusive:
26 Ibid., §§240–241.
27 Leo Strauss, Natural Right and History (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1953), pp. 214–215.
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and therefore in such Controversies, where the question is put, 
who shall be Judge? It cannot be meant, who shall decide the 
Controversie; every one knows what Jephtha here tells us, that the 
Lord the Judge, shall judge. Where there is no Judge on Earth, the 
Appeal lies to God in Heaven. That Question then cannot mean, 
who shall judge? whether another hath put himself in a State of 
War with me, and whether I may as Jephtha did, appeal to Heaven 
in it? Of that I myself can only be Judge in my own Conscience, as 
I will answer it at the great Day, to the Supream Judge of all Men.
One response to the lack of a judge in a substantive controversy is to 
ask for a judge to determine whether and when the controversy is irre-
solvable. Who wins the war of words is one thing; when it is legitimate 
to break it off and move to some other sort of resolution (for example, 
violence) is another. That latter question, Locke insists, is completely 
and equally up to each side to answer. Similarly, in a new version of 
the regress in the right of revolution section, not just resolving a con-
flict between a revolutionary and the existing government, but knowing 
exactly when it is legitimate to become a revolutionary in the first place 
(including presumably knowing when one’s “People” have lost all confi-
dence in their government), is in the end entirely one’s own conscientious 
choice, checked only by heaven’s validation: “[God] alone, ’tis true, is 
Judge of the Right. But every Man is Judge for himself, as in all other 
Cases, so in this, whether another hath put himself into a State of War 
with him, and whether he should appeal to heaven.” The upshot is that 
asking, “Who shall judge?” at a moment of irreconcilable claims is in 
fact a warrant for violent action. This is so even if one wants to read the 
theoretical acquisition of the Second Treatise as the lodging of constituent 
authority in the people; for, as §242 makes clear, normative contention 
over whether the prince has betrayed his trust is likely to be another 
casus belli.28
Leo Strauss founded a tradition of interpretation in which, in fact, 
this very point is the crux of the case for Locke’s nihilism. Locke, Strauss 
noted in Natural Right and History, “quotes more than once Jephtha’s 
saying, ‘the Lord the Judge be Judge’…. The statement of Jephtha takes the 
place in Locke’s doctrine of Paul’s statement ‘Let every soul be subject to 
the higher powers,’ which he hardly, if ever, quotes.”29 On Strauss’ reading, 
28 “But if the prince, or whoever they be in the administration, decline that way of 
determination [namely, by the people], the appeal then lies no where but to heaven; 
force between either persons, who have no known superior on earth, or which permits 
no appeal to a judge on earth, being properly a state of war.” Cf. Julian H. Franklin, John 
Locke and the Theory of Sovereignty (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978).
29 Strauss, Natural Right and History, pp. 214–215.
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the way I have reconstructed Locke’s appeal to the objectivity of norms 
is not just mistaken but the reverse of the truth. Strauss correctly saw 
Locke’s use of biblical “international society” as a fundamental template 
for conflict. But he found in appeals to heaven a wily means of releasing 
human conduct from any external constraints.
Only the simpleminded, the Straussian would say, could conclude (as 
I have) that the essence of Jephthah’s appeal to heaven is self-subjection 
to higher powers. “In the Second Treatise,” Thomas Pangle writes, 
heaven and the “appeal to heaven” is certainly a frequent theme. But 
it signifies not so much God’s executive enforcement of the law of 
nature, in another life, as God’s placing in man’s hands, in this life, 
the responsibility and right of the executive enforcement power…. 
in a well-organized and properly educated civil society, the threat of 
popular armed resistance substitutes for threats of hellfire and prom-
ises of paradise as a check on civic injustice. Vox populi, vox Dei.30
Another Straussian writer explains: “The appeal to heaven is not to have 
God’s power in the decision of victory, because armies and not God 
win battles…. In other words, the appeal to heaven is a euphemism for 
rebellion.”31 The point Strauss and his followers want to press is that far 
from placing himself—and politics—under biblical authority, Locke was 
in effect pioneering a full independence of human conduct from divine 
superintendence, since the practical effect of availability of the appeal to 
heaven is to war on-demand.
But like the overall Straussian interpretation of Locke, this specific 
reading of the function of the Jephthah story in Locke’s political thought 
seems to be deeply implausible. The Straussian view quite simply misses 
both the careful analysis and the subjective certainty required in all 
appeals to heaven and—most important—Locke’s subtle distinction 
between this subjective (and therefore possibly unwarranted) conviction 
and God’s undoubted objective judgment of right and wrong. The first 
point is that if one wants to claim that the true meaning of Locke’s cat-
egory of “the appeal to heaven” is merely “license for war,” then one 
should at least acknowledge the textual fact that Locke put strenuous 
30 Thomas Pangle, The Spirit of Modern Republicanism: The Moral Vision of the 
American Founders and the Philosophy of Locke (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1988), p. 204.
31 Margaret Michelle Barnes Smith, “The Philosophy of Liberty: Locke’s 
Machiavellian Teaching,” in Paul A. Rahe, ed., Machiavelli’s Liberal Republican Legacy 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), p. 55. She alludes to Machiavelli’s con-
clusion that “all the armed prophets conquered and the unarmed ones were ruined,” 
suggesting that Locke shared the Machiavellian conclusion that God has no role in 
human (and military) affairs.
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barriers before anyone who hoped to take advantage of this dreadful 
option. When mentioning Jephthah in a consideration of the right of 
conquest, Locke first responds to the objection that the possibility of 
appeals to heaven would cause “endless trouble” with the bravado reply 
that it would create “no more [trouble] than justice does.”32 But Locke 
does not only find that such appeals have to be treated as last resort.33 He 
also clarifies that “he that appeals to heaven must be sure he has right 
on his side… as he will answer at a tribunal that cannot be deceived, 
and will be sure to retribute to every one according to the mischiefs he 
hath created to his fellow subjects; that is, any part of mankind.”34 Locke 
thus insists that anyone appealing to heaven must really believe he is 
in the right, because the grief suffered by “any part of mankind” due 
to one’s premature or mistaken choice of the extreme solution is to be 
counted against him. There seems little reason for him to have entered 
these warnings, especially about the scope of harm that will be consid-
ered in cases of error, unless he sincerely believed that appeals to heaven 
were a terrible business foreclosed except in circumstances that justice 
required them.
The second and more important point is that Locke fundamentally 
distinguished between the subjective certainty required for appeals to 
heaven and the objective validity that he thought in those cases, as in 
Jephthah’s straits, God alone could provide. Locke never mentions the 
biblical narrator’s convinced statements—from the very verse whose end 
features the appeal to heaven—that Jephthah himself had “not sinned,” 
and that his enemy was clearly in the wrong.35 One might want to inter-
pret this omission as making his emphasis on epistemic uncertainty seem 
less inconsistent with the biblical text: the biblical narrator stresses not 
Jephthah’s uncertainty but his conviction. Yet the logic of Locke’s argu-
ment should lead him to see no problem on this score. He clearly does 
not want to confuse subjective warrant for belief in the justice of one’s 
cause—on which he strenuously insists—with its objective validity as 
32 Locke, Second Treatise, §176. It has been suggested that this material, together with 
that on property, was written separately from the rest of the work, but it is then interest-
ing that Jephthah retained his prominence in different stages of drafting (though not in 
Locke’s other works) and is invoked in a similar spirit. See J.R. Milton, “Dating Locke’s 
Second Treatise on Government,” History of Political Thought 16 (1995), pp. 356–390.
33 Locke, Second Treatise, §20, where in the first discussion of the appeal to heaven it 
is explicitly described as available only when there is no common judge and it is there-
fore “the only remedy in such cases.”
34 Ibid., §176. Locke also says there one must be sure that invoking one’s right of 
appeal “is worth the trouble and cost,” but this deliberation can be reached only on con-
dition that one is subjectively convinced that it is legitimate. 
35 Judges 11:27.
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determined by a neutral judge. The idea that norms of conduct are “eas-
ily discovered by the Light of Nature,” as Grotius had put it, is deemed 
by Strauss and his followers to be contradicted by the idea that there 
sometimes have to be wars over their interpretation. But this inference 
ignores that Locke seems fervently to have wanted to hold onto both 
points: that there are norms governing human conduct, and that it is 
not always clear where they point (especially when invoked against each 
other). As Kiyoshi Shimokawa has insightfully argued, “Locke’s account 
involves two distinct judgments”:
First, every man judges in his own conscience whether another 
party has put himself in a state of war with him, and whether he 
may use force to settle the dispute. At this level, there is no com-
mon judge, and every man acts as judge in the inner court of his 
conscience. The judgment made is bound to be subjective, however 
conscientiously it may be made. Second, God alone is the supreme 
judge who can objectively or impartially judge whether every man’s 
judgment and his consequent actions are right.36
There is nothing conceptually inconsistent about combining an emphasis 
on subjective conviction with one on objective uncertainty.37
5. Concluding Thoughts
The implausibility of just this distinction of epistemic capacities between 
God and man certainly makes Locke’s approach to just and unjust wars 
unviable in the present day. But his doctrine is interesting because there 
is a sense in which he was at the middle point between the Bible and the 
36 Kiyoshi Shimokawa, “Locke’s Concept of Justice,” in Peter R. Anstey, ed., The 
Philosophy of John Locke: New Perspectives (New York: Routledge, 2003), p. 77.
37 The Straussian reading is more easily available, because Locke’s Protestantism led 
him to individualize judgment and postpone it till after death. Instead of the immedi-
ate confirmation that the Bible seems to provide, the Lockean Jephthah awaits later and 
personal adjudication. Though I cannot explore this here, the final Jephthah reference 
in the text makes clear that Locke also may have been driven to this conclusion by his 
belief that the just do not always win the battle, which may lead them to legitimately 
prepare another try. “Perhaps Justice is denied,” he says in Second Treatise, §176. “If God 
has taken away all means of seeking remedy, there is nothing left but patience. But my 
Son, when able, may seek the Relief of the Law, which I am denied: He or his Son may 
renew his Appeal, till he recover his Right. But the Conquered, or his Children, have 
no Court, no Arbitrator on Earth to appeal to. Then they may appeal, as Jephtha did, 
to Heaven, and repeat their Appeal, till they have recovered the native Right of their 
Ancestors…. If it be objected, this would cause endless trouble; I answer, No more than 
Justice does, where she lies open to all that appeal to her.” Among other problems raised 
by Locke’s postponement of the appeal’s resolution—for the sake of a people more like 
the Ammonites than their enemies!—is that the possibility of repetition it affords sug-
gests divine judgment may not be so authoritative after all.
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present day. He was no longer able to stress that God judges in the strong 
sense of determining events not just in heaven but on earth, and so he felt 
the need to effect a transfer to human judgment: his fidelity to the biblical 
tradition of trust in God survives only in the rare situation when human-
ity absolutely fails to resolve differences. Appeals to heaven are only for 
fearful moments when there are no other choices, and the state is sup-
posed to help avoid only the most irresolvable impasses. The spirit of the 
Lord still comes to Jephthah in Judges 11:29, so the rabbis invoke him to 
illustrate that the most humble can be raised up to serve divine purposes 
(“Jephthah in his generation is like Samuel in his generation”). For Locke, 
by contrast, human equality is founded precisely on God’s now seemingly 
permanent absence, with Jephthah providing guidance only when usu-
ally workable human institutions are unavailing.38 Yet, while the sacred is 
displaced by the secular to an astonishing degree in Locke’s account, the 
appeal to heaven remains in cases of last resort.
We are no longer able to share Locke’s faith in divine judgment over 
our moral acts, to the point that—with Strauss—it is tempting to attri-
bute to Locke the cynical perspective that his invocations of God simply 
cloak a secret but resolute anthropocentrism and immoralism. Strauss’ 
view, in other words, is unwittingly revealing of an important truth. The 
irony is that Strauss—who chose biblical epigraphs for Natural Right and 
History and sometimes suggested he was defending a biblical, and not 
just classical, alternative to destitute modernity—could simply not believe 
that Locke believed. He was wrong, but we share the assumptions that 
allowed for his mistake.
The premise the Bible and John Locke shared, that secular moral rea-
soning and sacred moral judgment cannot be separated in the end, is no 
longer available. We still seek grounds for knowing when our wars are just 
or unjust, but, for better or worse, we may no longer permit ourselves to 
trust that there is some nonhuman judge to check our best guess or ada-
mant conviction about when to fight. We have to make do with the secular 
alone in crafting doctrines of war and peace, and we should not pretend 
otherwise; and the memory of God’s rule that still persisted in Locke must 
now give way to his argument that if there is a need for a common judge to 
settle our disputes, internally or internationally, we must find a way to pro-
vide it ourselves. But perhaps that memory made the argument possible at 
38 “Unless,” as Locke famously says, “the Lord and Master of them all should, by any 
manifest Declaration of his Will, set one above another, and confer on him, by an evi-
dent and clear appointment, an undoubted Right to Dominion and Sovereignty”—but 
this does not happen anymore (Treatise, §4). For the rabbinic dictum, see Babylonian 
Talmud, Rosh Hashana 25b.
Hebraic Political Studies  303
all—as a kind of parting gift, and fading guarantee, that Locke still needed 
in order to claim the risky autonomy of human self-government.
Columbia University
